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After the burst of the bubble in the 1990s, Japan has continued to see a crisis in its financial 
sector. The elements which helped cause and continue to contribute to this crisis revolve around 
the issue of nonperforming loans (NPL) and include the motivations of banks to provide 
corporate loans, the system of regulation of banks, and the slow response of the government to 
the crisis. Out of these elements, the slow response of the government has allowed this crisis to 
continue and provided the largest impact on the situation.
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Motivations
Banks in Japan have concentrated on the 
business of select industrial groups (keiretsu) and 
become the “main” banks for companies within the 
group. This allowed them to offering lower rates and 
be a source of support for these industrial groups. 
“While borrowing from a number of banks, most 
corporations maintained close ties to one particular 
bank, their ‘main bank.’ Corporations valued 
these close ties because the main banks implicit 
commitment to bail out its firms when hit by hard 
times” (Rosenbluth, 1989, p.42). Continuous business 
contacts with the same group of companies provided 
a sense of familiarity for banks and allowed them 
to decrease costs in tracking the credit worthiness 
of these businesses. It was easier to provide loans 
to these groups without close inspection of their 
financial situation. One of the main objectives of 
banks was to provide capital for industry and to 
meet this end banks kept interest rates low to free 
money for corporate investment.  “The system of 
controlled interest rates also helped the banks, 
because it guaranteed them a healthy spread between 
the low rate they gave to depositors and the higher 
rate they charged industry for loans” (Vogel, 1996, 
p.169). This control of interest rates was also seen 
as an element in the protection of banks; it would 
reduce bank failures. Why didn’t the public take 
action against these low rates? “When collective 
action barriers operate as predicted by George 
Stigler’s elegant, simple supply and demand theory 
of regulation producer groups always win and 
consumers always lose” (Rosenbluth, 1989, p.9). The 
banks responded to the groups who were organized 
and since the public was unorganized, interest rates 
on small savings deposits continued to be low. 
Corporations, however, were organized. “Moreover, 
corporate customers have access to competitive 
foreign suppliers of banking services, Japanese banks 
must offer attractive deposit yields and loans that 
retain their clients” (Rosenbluth, 1989, p.11). Banks 
had an incentive to provide loans to corporations as 
this was the core of their business and when these 
corporations had financial difficulty the banks were 
forced to provide more loans.
The Regulation of Banks
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is responsible 
for regulating banks and up to the 1990’s it was able 
to state that it had not allowed a single bank to fail. 
How did this record come to a sudden end? First 
it is important to look at the structure of the MOF 
and then second to look at problems of regulation 
associated with this structure.
The MOF is divided into several bureaus with 
different responsibilities including a bureau which 
is responsible for the regulation of banks. Instead 
of working in one bureau for the period of their 
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employment, employees at MOF rotate through the 
various bureaus which limit their expertise in each 
area and focus their attention on the MOF as a whole 
instead of each select bureau. “Bureaucrats who 
push too hard for sectional interests at the expense 
of MOF’s integrity can expect to be bypassed for 
important positions” (Rosenbluth, 1989, p.20). 
During their limited time in each bureau how did 
bureaucrats regulate the financial sector?
Akiyoshi Horiuchi descr ibes the Japanese 
financial system as being backed by a safety net 
provided by the bureaucracy. The method used by 
the bureaucracy to create this safety net is not based 
on enforcing a strict set of regulations but instead 
on providing guidance.  Richard Samuels states 
“the Japanese bureaucracy does not dominate, it 
negotiates” (Samuels, 1987, p.260) If a bank runs 
into serious trouble beyond what just guidance could 
resolve, the MOF would place some of its officers 
on the board of that bank or even try to get a larger 
banks to absorb the small banks. The larger bank 
would take on the liability of the troubled smaller 
bank but would benefit by being able to expand into 
the branches of the bank it took over. MOF would 
benefit by preventing a bank from failing. By using 
this system of guidance instead of direct intervention 
the MOF was able achieve several goals. It kept the 
intrusion of politicians to a minimum, protecting 
its own territory and still satisfying the financial 
sector. Banks would be able to save costs associated 
with lobbying politicians as their role was limited. 
MOF could also influence banks to follow its advice 
by controlling the opening of new branches. Banks 
which followed MOF guidance would have an easier 
time opening new branches than a bank which didn’t. 
“Not surprisingly the most common policy-making 
pattern that results is one of stable negotiation 
between bureaucracy and financial institutions” 
(Rosenbluth, 1989, p.8). This method of saving banks 
was hindered as worsening economic conditions and 
declining bank profits put banks in a situation to take 
larger risks which in turn limited their ability to take 
over other banks.
The relationship between MOF monitors and 
banks contributed to nonproductive loan crisis. 
“The viability of the comprehensive safety net is 
crucially dependent on the effectiveness of prudential 
regulation implemented by regulatory authorities. 
The effectiveness of prudential regulation, in turn, 
depends on how motivated those authorities are to 
monitor bank management rigorously” (Horiuchi & 
Shimizu, 2001, p.31). MOF bureaucrats would stay 
with the agency for their entire government career 
with the hope of advancing to better positions. Better 
positions within MOF increased the possibilities of 
employment after retirement outside of the agency. 
Bureaucrats in MOF were assigned to monitor banks, 
but these same bureaucrats would look to these banks 
for future employment. The amakudari system would 
limit the effectiveness of MOF monitoring of banks 
and allow those banks to take risks which they might 
otherwise have not been able to do. “Two groups of 
banks accepting amakudari officials from MOF as 
of 1985 had a bad loan ratio almost double that of the 
banks accepting no amakudari officials” (Horiuchi & 
Shimizu, 2001, p.34). While some may argue that the 
amakudari system could provide a better regulation 
of banks due to the close relationship between  MOF 
and bank officials or the expectation that MOF 
officials need to do their job well in order to later 
be offered an amakudari position this was not the 
case. “The relationship between monetary authorities 
and private banks through the so-called amakudari 
system was not an effective substitute for effective 
prudential regulations in disciplining banks. Rather, 
the amakudari system induced banks to lower equity 
capital ratios, and to engage in aggressive risk-taking 
during the so-called “bubble period” of the late 
1980s” (Horiuchi & Shimizu, 2001, p.34).
Response
“In 1991, a massive speculative bubble burst 
in Japan, leaving the nat ion’s banks with an 
enormous burden of nonperforming loans” (Amyx, 
2010, p.1). The methods of giving guidance and 
monitoring failed to prevent and actually contributed 
to the nonproductive loan crisis. What was the 
government’s response to this crisis? “To help 
large struggling banks a strategy of public capital 
injections comes into the picture” (Hamada, 2002, 
p.12). Providing public money would have reduced 
some of the effects of the crisis but the Japanese 
government’s response was delayed. The reactions of 
several groups contributed to this delay. MOF used 
valuable assets to defend itself from losing power to 
interference from politicians instead of tackling the 
problem. The ruling coalition government placed 
blame publicly on the shoulders of MOF instead of 
working together for a solution. Information did not 
flow fleeing as avoidance of blame was a concern. 
“Ministry officials thus drew on their network ties 
not only with financial institutions but also with 
other government agencies to influence the nature of 
publicly available information and the interpretation 
of this information” (Amyx, 2004, p.31). Instead of 
working together on the problem the various groups 
involved ‘circled the wagons’ to protect themselves.
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Conclusion
While the motivations of banks to provide 
corporate loans and the system of regulation of banks 
contributed to the nonproductive loan crisis, the slow 
response of the government proved to be the most 
damaging. The motivation of banks and the system 
of regulation were flawed but these factors can be 
seen in, at least a semi-positive light. Banks were not 
motivated to cause a crisis. They had an incentive 
to keep business going and correct problems. The 
system of regulation can also be seen in a semi-
positive light. Why would a MOF official allow a 
bank to slip into a situation where it could be forced 
to close if he or she was looking to get a job with that 
bank in the future? The reaction of the government, 
in contrast to the other two factors, does not have 
a positive side. Attempts to assess blame, cover or 
distort information, and self-protection delayed the 
government’s response and continues to be a factor in 
the Japanese fiscal crisis.
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